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Slide 01
Economic Crises Through History
- Bubbles, panics, crashes, and depressions: a journey through the recurring human pattern of euphoria, excess, and collapse that has shaped economies for four centuries.
- 32 slides • Scroll to navigate
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Slide 02
Table of Contents
- Anatomy of a Crisis
- Tulip Mania (1637)
- The South Sea Bubble (1720)
- The Mississippi Scheme (1720)
- The Panic of 1825
- The Long Depression (1873-1896)
- The Panic of 1907
- The Great Depression (1929-1939)
- Causes of the Great Depression
- Policy Failures of the 1930s
- Latin American Debt Crisis (1982)
- Japanese Asset Bubble (1986-1991)
- Japan's Lost Decades
- The Tequila Crisis (1994)
- Asian Financial Crisis (1997)
- Russian Default (1998)
- The Dot-Com Bust (2000)
- Argentine Default (2001)
- The Global Financial Crisis (2007-2009)
- Anatomy of the Subprime Crisis
- The Lehman Moment
- European Sovereign Debt Crisis (2010-2015)
- The Greek Tragedy
- COVID-19 Economic Shock (2020)
- Crypto Crashes (2022)
- Minsky's Financial Instability
- Kindleberger's Model
- Lessons Never Learned
- Further Reading
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Slide 03
Anatomy of a Crisis
- Financial crises follow a remarkably consistent pattern across centuries and geographies. Charles Kindleberger identified the stages in his classic Manias, Panics, and Crashes (1978).
- 1. Displacement
- A new opportunity or innovation sparks excitement: canals, railroads, dot-coms, housing, crypto. Credit expands to finance it.
- 2. Boom
- Prices rise, drawing in more investors. Success stories proliferate. "This time is different" arguments emerge. Leverage increases.
- 3. Euphoria
- Speculation becomes detached from fundamentals. Novice investors enter. Fraud and excess flourish at the margins. Skeptics are mocked.
- 4. Profit-Taking
- Smart money exits quietly. Prices plateau. Some insiders begin to sell.
- 5. Panic
- A trigger event (bank failure, fraud revelation, policy change) shatters confidence. Everyone tries to sell simultaneously. Prices collapse. Contagion spreads.
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Slide 04
Tulip Mania (1637)
- The first well-documented speculative bubble. In the winter of 1636-37, prices for tulip bulbs in the Dutch Republic reached extraordinary levels before crashing spectacularly in February 1637.
- The Bubble
- Rare tulip varieties (Semper Augustus) traded for 10,000 guilders -- the price of a canal house in Amsterdam
- Futures contracts on bulbs still in the ground changed hands multiple times
- Tavern-based trading sessions attracted artisans and laborers
- Peak prices in January 1637 represented 10x appreciation in months
- The Crash
- February 3, 1637: Haarlem auction finds no buyers at any price
- Prices collapsed 90%+ within weeks
- Courts refused to enforce contracts, calling them gambling debts
- Actual economic damage was limited -- mostly wealthy speculators lost
- Modern scholars (Goldgar, Thompson) argue the mania was smaller than legend suggests
- "The price of tulips rose so high that a single bulb could buy a house, but no house could buy the wisdom to see it was folly."
- -- Popular paraphrase of 17th-century Dutch accounts
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Slide 05
The South Sea Bubble (1720)
- The South Sea Company was granted a monopoly on British trade with South America -- trade that barely existed. What followed was one of history's most dramatic stock market manias.
- 1711 -- South Sea Company founded to convert government debt into shares
- Jan 1720 -- Shares at 128 pounds
- Spring 1720 -- Company proposes converting all government debt; shares soar
- June 1720 -- Shares peak at 1,050 pounds (8x appreciation in 6 months)
- Sept 1720 -- Bubble bursts; shares collapse to 150 pounds by December
- 1721 -- Parliamentary investigation; directors' estates confiscated
- Victims included: Isaac Newton, who lost 20,000 pounds and reportedly said: "I can calculate the motions of heavenly bodies, but not the madness of people." King George I was governor of the company. The Chancellor of the Exchequer was imprisoned for fraud.
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Slide 06
The Mississippi Scheme (1720)
- Simultaneous with the South Sea Bubble, John Law's Mississippi Company in France engineered an even more audacious scheme -- essentially attempting to replace France's entire monetary system with paper backed by speculative colonial ventures.
- The Innovation
- Law convinced the Regent to create a national bank issuing paper currency (Banque Royale)
- Mississippi Company monopolized French colonial trade
- Company absorbed all French government debt
- Shares rose from 500 livres to 18,000 livres (36x) in 1719
- Law became Controller-General of Finances -- the most powerful man in France
- The Collapse
- Early 1720: investors began converting shares to gold
- May 1720: forced devaluation of shares and notes
- Hyperinflationary paper issuance destroyed confidence
- Law fled France in December 1720
- Legacy: French distrust of paper money and banking lasted a century
- Law was arguably the first modern central banker -- his failure discredited the concept of managed fiat currency for generations.
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Slide 07
The Panic of 1825
- The first modern international financial crisis. Speculative lending to newly independent Latin American nations and a stock market boom in London led to a banking panic that nearly brought down the Bank of England.
- Context
- Post-Napoleonic boom in British industry. Latin American independence created excitement about trade and mining prospects. British investors poured capital into Mexican silver mines, Colombian bonds, and even the fictional "Republic of Poyais."
- The Crash
- Bank of England raised rates in late 1825 to protect gold reserves. Six London banks failed in December. Over 70 country banks collapsed. Manufacturing slumped; unemployment soared.
- Legacy
- First crisis where the Bank of England acted as lender of last resort (reluctantly). Most Latin American loans defaulted -- some countries didn't resume payments for 50 years. Established the recurring pattern of emerging market boom-bust cycles.
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Slide 08
The Long Depression (1873-1896)
- A prolonged period of deflation and economic instability triggered by the failure of Jay Cooke & Company in the US and the Vienna stock exchange crash. Some historians consider it the worst global depression before the 1930s.
- 23 yrs
- Duration of price deflation
- -65%
- US railroad stock decline (1873)
- US railroads that went bankrupt
- 18,000
- US businesses that failed (1873-75)
- Causes
- Over-investment in railroads (US) and industry (Europe)
- Franco-Prussian war indemnity distorted capital flows
- Gold standard imposed deflationary pressure as economies grew faster than gold supply
- German and American industrialization flooded markets
- Consequences
- Rise of protectionism across Europe (Bismarck's tariffs, 1879)
- Populist movements (US Free Silver movement)
- New imperialism: European scramble for colonies as outlet
- Concentration of industry into trusts and cartels
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Slide 09
The Panic of 1907
- The crisis that created the Federal Reserve. A failed attempt to corner the copper market triggered a cascade of bank runs in New York that threatened to bring down the entire US financial system.
- Oct 1907 -- F. Augustus Heinze's copper corner fails; banks connected to him face runs
- Oct 22 -- Knickerbocker Trust Company faces a run; president begs J.P. Morgan for help
- Oct 23 -- Knickerbocker suspends payments; panic spreads to other trust companies
- Oct 24 -- J.P. Morgan assembles bank presidents; organizes private bailout
- Nov 1907 -- Morgan forces US Steel acquisition of Tennessee Coal to stabilize markets
- 1913 -- Federal Reserve Act passed to prevent reliance on private individuals for crisis management
- The core lesson: a modern economy cannot depend on the goodwill of a single private banker. Public institutions must provide the lender-of-last-resort function.
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Slide 10
The Great Depression (1929-1939)
- The defining economic catastrophe of the 20th century. Beginning with the Wall Street crash of October 1929, it engulfed virtually every economy on Earth, lasted a decade, and fundamentally transformed the role of government.
- -89%
- Dow Jones peak-to-trough (1929-1932)
- 25%
- US unemployment peak (1933)
- -30%
- US GDP decline (1929-33)
- 9,000
- US bank failures (1930-33)
- -65%
- Collapse in world trade (1929-34)
- 10 yrs
- Before US GDP recovered 1929 level
- The Depression destroyed faith in laissez-faire capitalism, created the conditions for fascism in Europe, and gave birth to Keynesian economics, social security systems, and active monetary policy.
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Slide 11
Causes of the Great Depression
- Economists have debated the causes for nearly a century. The modern consensus draws on multiple explanations rather than a single cause.
- Monetarist View (Friedman & Schwartz)
- The Fed allowed the money supply to contract by one-third (1929-33). Bank failures destroyed deposits. The Fed should have expanded credit aggressively but instead raised rates to defend gold convertibility.
- Keynesian View
- Collapse of investment and consumer spending (aggregate demand) created a deflationary spiral. The "paradox of thrift" -- rational individual saving becomes collectively destructive.
- Debt-Deflation (Fisher)
- Falling prices increased the real burden of debt. Debtors cut spending to service loans; this further reduced prices; debt burdens grew heavier. A vicious cycle with no natural floor.
- Gold Standard (Eichengreen)
- The international gold standard transmitted deflation globally. Countries that left gold earliest (UK 1931, US 1933) recovered fastest. Those that clung to gold (France until 1936) suffered longest.
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Slide 12
Policy Failures of the 1930s
- The Depression was deepened and prolonged by catastrophic policy choices that modern economists overwhelmingly condemn.
- Smoot-Hawley Tariff (1930)
- US raised tariffs to historic highs; 60+ countries retaliated. World trade collapsed by two-thirds. Turned a US recession into a global depression.
- Fed Inaction
- The Fed allowed 9,000 banks to fail, destroying the money supply. Raised rates in 1931 to stop gold outflows -- the opposite of what was needed. Bernanke called it "the Fed's worst mistake."
- Balanced Budget Orthodoxy
- Hoover and initially Roosevelt tried to balance the budget during the downturn -- cutting spending and raising taxes when the economy needed stimulus.
- Gold Standard Fetishism
- Central banks prioritized gold convertibility over domestic employment. Countries that broke from gold recovered; those that didn't continued to deflate and suffer.
- "Regarding the Great Depression: You're right, we did it. We're very sorry. But thanks to you, we won't do it again."
- -- Ben Bernanke to Milton Friedman, 2002
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Slide 13
Latin American Debt Crisis (1982)
- In August 1982, Mexico announced it could not service its foreign debt. Within months, virtually every major Latin American economy was in default or rescheduling -- threatening the solvency of major US banks.
- Origins
- 1970s petrodollar recycling: oil exporters deposited in Western banks; banks lent to Latin America
- Volcker's rate hikes (1979-82) tripled debt service costs overnight
- Commodity price collapse reduced export revenues
- Total Latin American debt: $327 billion (1982)
- Nine major US banks had 176% of capital exposed to Latin America
- Consequences
- The "Lost Decade": Latin American GDP per capita didn't recover until 1990s
- IMF structural adjustment programs imposed austerity
- Hyperinflation in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Peru
- Brady Plan (1989) finally resolved through debt-for-bond swaps
- Spawned "Washington Consensus" policy prescriptions
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Slide 14
Japanese Asset Bubble (1986-1991)
- In the late 1980s, Japan experienced the largest asset bubble in modern history. At its peak, the Imperial Palace grounds in Tokyo were theoretically worth more than all the real estate in California.
- 38,916
- Nikkei 225 peak (Dec 29, 1989)
- -80%
- Stock market decline (1989-2003)
- Tokyo land price increase (1985-91)
- $20T
- Estimated wealth destruction
- Causes
- Plaza Accord (1985): Yen appreciation forced Bank of Japan to cut rates aggressively
- Financial deregulation: Banks competed recklessly for market share
- Hubris: "Japan as Number One" narrative fed speculation
- Cross-shareholding: Companies and banks held each other's shares, creating circular price support
- Loose monetary policy: BOJ kept rates too low too long (2.5% from 1987-89)
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Slide 15
Japan's Lost Decades
- The aftermath of Japan's bubble is the canonical example of a balance sheet recession. Despite near-zero interest rates and massive fiscal stimulus, Japan struggled with deflation and stagnation for over 20 years.
- Zombie Banks
- Banks concealed bad loans rather than writing them down. This kept insolvent "zombie firms" alive, misallocating capital and suppressing investment. Decisive restructuring didn't happen until 2003.
- Liquidity Trap
- Interest rates hit zero by 1999. Monetary policy became ineffective -- the Bank of Japan pushed on a string. Invented QE (2001) but it had limited impact with broken banking transmission.
- Demographic Headwinds
- Working-age population peaked in 1995 and has declined since. Aging population saves more, spends less, and reduces aggregate demand structurally.
- Legacy
- Nikkei 225 didn't surpass its 1989 high until 2024 -- a 34-year wait. Japan became the cautionary tale for every subsequent asset bubble.
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Slide 16
The Tequila Crisis (1994)
- Mexico's peso devaluation in December 1994 triggered capital flight across Latin America -- the first major crisis of the era of mobile international capital.
- The Setup
- Mexico had pegged the peso to the dollar while running large current account deficits
- Short-term dollar-denominated bonds (Tesobonos) financed the deficit
- NAFTA implementation created optimism; capital poured in
- Political shocks (Zapatista uprising, assassinations) shook confidence in 1994
- Foreign reserves drained from $29B to $6B by December
- Aftermath
- Peso lost 50% of value in weeks
- GDP fell 6.2% in 1995; 1 million jobs lost
- US Treasury and IMF organized $50 billion rescue package
- Recovery was rapid -- Mexico repaid early by 1997
- Contagion hit Argentina, Brazil ("Tequila Effect")
- Lesson: fixed exchange rates + open capital accounts + fiscal deficits = crisis
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Slide 17
Asian Financial Crisis (1997)
- Beginning with the Thai baht devaluation on July 2, 1997, the crisis rapidly engulfed Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines -- destroying the "Asian miracle" narrative overnight.
- -83%
- Indonesian rupiah decline (1997-98)
- -13.1%
- Indonesia GDP (1998)
- -5.8%
- South Korea GDP (1998)
- $120B
- IMF rescue packages (total)
- Pattern
- Dollar-pegged currencies encouraged unhedged foreign borrowing
- Short-term dollar debts funded long-term domestic investments (maturity mismatch)
- Crony capitalism and connected lending created hidden vulnerabilities
- Capital flight triggered self-fulfilling currency collapses
- IMF conditionality (austerity, high rates) initially worsened the downturn -- later acknowledged as excessive
- Legacy: Asian nations accumulated massive foreign exchange reserves ($12T today) as self-insurance against future crises.
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Slide 18
Russian Default (1998)
- On August 17, 1998, Russia defaulted on its domestic government bonds and devalued the ruble -- sending shockwaves through global financial markets and nearly destroying Long-Term Capital Management.
- Russia's Crisis
- Post-Soviet transition: GDP had already fallen 40% (1991-98)
- Government funded deficits with high-yield GKO bonds (yields reached 200%)
- Asian crisis reduced oil and commodity prices
- Tax collection collapsed; oligarchs extracted wealth
- Default: $40 billion in GKOs restructured at 5 cents on the dollar
- LTCM
- Nobel laureate-run hedge fund with $4.7B in capital and $125B in assets
- Leveraged convergence trades assumed correlations would hold
- Russian default caused "flight to quality" -- all correlations went to 1
- LTCM lost $4.6 billion in weeks
- Fed organized private bailout ($3.6B from 14 banks) to prevent systemic collapse
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Slide 19
The Dot-Com Bust (2000)
- The NASDAQ rose 400% from 1995 to its peak of 5,048 on March 10, 2000 -- then lost 78% over the next two years. The internet revolution was real, but valuations were fantasy.
- The Mania
- Pets.com, Webvan, eToys -- companies with no profits valued at billions
- "Eyeballs" replaced earnings as the valuation metric
- IPO first-day pops of 100-600% were routine
- Day trading became a national pastime
- Alan Greenspan warned of "irrational exuberance" in 1996 -- 4 years too early
- The Bust
- NASDAQ peak: 5,048 (March 2000); trough: 1,114 (October 2002)
- $5 trillion in market value destroyed
- Over 50% of dot-coms ceased to exist by 2004
- Recession was mild -- no banking crisis (unlike 2008)
- Survivors (Amazon, Google, eBay) dominated the next era
- Key Difference from 2008
- The dot-com bust destroyed equity wealth but didn't threaten the banking system. There was no leverage crisis, no credit crunch, no housing wealth destruction. The recession was sharp but brief.
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Slide 20
Argentine Default (2001)
- Argentina's $95 billion sovereign default -- the largest in history at the time -- was the culmination of a decade of currency board rigidity that ultimately proved incompatible with fiscal reality.
- 1991 -- Convertibility Plan: 1 peso = 1 dollar, backed by law
- 1991-98 -- Stability and growth; inflation eliminated; capital pours in
- 1999 -- Brazil devalues; Argentine exports become uncompetitive
- 2000-01 -- Recession deepens; government borrows to maintain the peg
- Dec 2001 -- "Corralito": bank deposits frozen; riots; president flees by helicopter
- Jan 2002 -- Default declared; peso devalued 70%; GDP falls 10.9%
- 2003-07 -- Rapid recovery after devaluation restores competitiveness
- The lesson: fixed exchange rate regimes can deliver stability for years, but when they fail, the crash is catastrophic. No fiscal adjustment could save a currency peg that had become fundamentally misaligned.
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Slide 21
The Global Financial Crisis (2007-2009)
- The worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Triggered by the collapse of the US housing bubble, it revealed the fragility of a financial system built on securitized debt, shadow banking, and extreme leverage.
- $10T
- US household wealth destroyed
- 8.7M
- US jobs lost (2008-10)
- -4.3%
- Peak US GDP decline
- $700B
- TARP bank bailout
- 10M
- US home foreclosures (2006-14)
- -57%
- S&P 500 decline (peak to trough)
- Unlike previous post-war recessions, recovery was painfully slow. US unemployment remained above 7% for four years. The crisis fundamentally reshaped banking regulation, central bank mandates, and public trust in financial institutions.
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Slide 22
Anatomy of the Subprime Crisis
- The chain of causation ran from Main Street mortgage fraud to Wall Street securitization to global contagion -- each link multiplying the final damage.
- 1. Mortgage Origination
- Lenders offered "NINJA" loans (no income, no job, no assets) with teaser rates. Brokers earned fees on volume regardless of loan quality. "You could have a pulse and get a mortgage."
- 2. Securitization
- Banks bundled mortgages into CDOs (collateralized debt obligations). Rating agencies stamped AAA on senior tranches. Risk appeared to vanish -- it just became invisible.
- 3. Leverage
- Banks held CDOs with 30:1 leverage. AIG sold $500B in credit default swaps (insurance) without capital to back them. Shadow banking created systemic risk outside regulated banking.
- 4. Contagion
- When housing prices fell 30%, "AAA" securities became worthless. Counterparty uncertainty froze interbank lending. Credit markets seized globally. The real economy followed.
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Slide 23
The Lehman Moment
- September 15, 2008: Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy -- the largest in US history ($639 billion in assets). The decision not to bail out Lehman transformed a serious crisis into a near-collapse of the global financial system.
- Why Lehman Mattered
- Counterparty to thousands of derivatives contracts worldwide
- Money market funds that held Lehman paper "broke the buck" -- triggering panic withdrawals
- Signal that ANY institution could fail destroyed trust in the entire system
- Interbank lending froze completely -- LIBOR-OIS spread exploded
- Global trade collapsed as letters of credit dried up
- Emergency Response
- AIG bailout ($182B) -- two days after Lehman
- TARP ($700B) -- October 2008
- Fed: zero rates, QE1, emergency lending facilities
- Coordinated G7 rate cuts (Oct 8, 2008)
- UK bank nationalization (RBS, Lloyds)
- Global fiscal stimulus ($5T committed by G20)
- "If we don't do this, we may not have an economy on Monday."
- -- Ben Bernanke to Congressional leaders, September 18, 2008
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Slide 24
European Sovereign Debt Crisis (2010-2015)
- The GFC mutated into a sovereign debt crisis in Europe. Countries that had borrowed cheaply under the euro's umbrella found markets suddenly discriminating -- bond yields spiked, austerity was imposed, and the eurozone nearly broke apart.
- PIIGS
- Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain -- the periphery nations whose spreads over German bunds exploded. Ireland: banking crisis. Greece: fiscal fraud. Spain: housing bust. Each story was different but contagion was mutual.
- Structural Flaw
- Monetary union without fiscal union: countries couldn't devalue their currency OR rely on federal transfers. The only adjustment mechanism was internal devaluation (wage cuts, deflation) -- politically devastating.
- Resolution
- Draghi's "whatever it takes" (July 2012) was the turning point. European Stability Mechanism, banking union, and ultimately ECB bond purchases (QE from 2015) stabilized the system -- at the cost of years of austerity.
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Slide 25
The Greek Tragedy
- Greece's crisis was the most severe in a developed economy since the Great Depression. GDP fell 26% from peak to trough -- worse than the US in the 1930s.
- -26%
- Greek GDP decline (2008-2013)
- 27.5%
- Peak unemployment (2013)
- 60%
- Youth unemployment peak
- Bailout programs (2010, 2012, 2015)
- Oct 2009 -- New government reveals deficit was 12.7%, not 3.7% as reported
- May 2010 -- First bailout (110B euros); brutal austerity conditions
- 2012 -- Largest sovereign debt restructuring in history (53.5% haircut on private holders)
- 2015 -- Syriza government elected on anti-austerity platform; capital controls imposed; third bailout
- 2018 -- Greece exits bailout program; but debt-to-GDP remains ~180%
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Slide 26
COVID-19 Economic Shock (2020)
- The sharpest global contraction in modern history -- not from financial excess but from a deliberate shutdown of economic activity to contain a pandemic. The policy response was unprecedented in speed and scale.
- The Shock
- Global GDP fell 3.1% in 2020 -- worst since WWII
- US: 22 million jobs lost in March-April 2020
- Advanced economy GDP fell 4.5% on average
- Oil prices briefly went negative (April 2020)
- Supply chains shattered; semiconductor shortages lasted 2 years
- The Response
- Fiscal: $16.9 trillion globally (IMF estimate)
- Fed: cut to zero in one meeting; unlimited QE; corporate bond purchases
- Direct payments to citizens (US: $3,200 per adult over 3 rounds)
- Furlough schemes (UK, Europe) preserved employment relationships
- Result: fastest recovery in history -- US GDP recovered by Q2 2021
- Aftermath: The massive stimulus contributed to 40-year-high inflation (9.1% in US, June 2022), requiring aggressive rate hikes that echoed Volcker.
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Slide 27
Crypto Crashes (2022)
- The collapse of Terra/Luna, Three Arrows Capital, Celsius, Voyager, and FTX in 2022 destroyed $2 trillion in crypto market value -- a modern-day cautionary tale combining many classic crisis elements.
- Terra/Luna (May 2022)
- Algorithmic stablecoin (UST) promised 20% yields through Anchor protocol. When confidence cracked, a "death spiral" destroyed $60 billion in value within a week. Classic bank-run dynamics on a DeFi protocol.
- Contagion
- Three Arrows Capital (leveraged crypto hedge fund) failed. Celsius and Voyager (crypto lenders) froze withdrawals. Hidden interconnections revealed -- just like 2008 but in miniature.
- FTX (Nov 2022)
- Third-largest crypto exchange collapsed when revealed to have lent customer deposits to Alameda Research (sister trading firm). Sam Bankman-Fried convicted of fraud. $8 billion in customer funds lost.
- Old lesson relearned: leverage, opacity, commingled funds, and uncritical faith in brilliant founders produce the same outcome in every era -- only the technology changes.
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Slide 28
Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis
- Hyman Minsky (1919-1996) argued that stability itself is destabilizing. In good times, success breeds overconfidence, which breeds excessive risk-taking, which breeds crisis. The system is inherently cyclical.
- Hedge Finance
- Borrowers can service both interest and principal from income. Conservative, sustainable. Predominates after crises when memory of pain is fresh.
- Speculative Finance
- Borrowers can service interest but must roll over principal (refinance). Dependent on functioning credit markets. Common in mid-cycle expansion.
- Ponzi Finance
- Borrowers cannot service even interest -- they depend on rising asset prices to refinance. Subprime mortgages, leveraged buyouts at peak valuations, many crypto projects. Predominates at cycle peaks.
- "The Minsky moment" -- the point where overleveraged borrowers are forced to sell assets to meet margin calls, causing a cascade of price declines and further forced selling.
- -- Paul McCulley (coined the term, 1998)
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Slide 29
Kindleberger's Model
- Charles Kindleberger synthesized centuries of crisis history into a unified framework, building on Minsky's instability hypothesis. His Manias, Panics, and Crashes (1978) remains the essential text.
- The Five Stages (Detailed)
- Displacement: Exogenous shock creates new profit opportunity (war end, invention, deregulation)
- Credit expansion: Banks and financial innovation provide fuel. New instruments emerge (CDOs, SPACs, DeFi)
- Euphoria: "New era" thinking. Overtrading. Swindlers and fraud proliferate at the margin
- Distress: Insiders sell. Prices plateau. Some participants recognize the unsustainability
- Revulsion: Panic selling, fire sales, credit contraction, contagion across markets and borders
- Cross-Crisis Patterns
- New financial instruments appear to eliminate risk (they don't)
- "This time is different" narratives peak just before the crash
- International contagion through capital flows and confidence
- A lender of last resort can arrest the panic -- if it acts quickly
- Memory fades within 10-15 years; the cycle repeats
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Slide 30
Lessons Never Learned
- Despite centuries of evidence, the same patterns recur with each generation. Why?
- Institutional Memory Decay
- Regulations written after crises are weakened during subsequent booms. Glass-Steagall (1933) lasted 66 years before repeal (1999). Dodd-Frank is already being diluted.
- Incentive Misalignment
- "I'll be gone, you'll be gone" -- individual actors profit from risk-taking while losses are socialized. Bonus structures reward short-term gains; taxpayers absorb long-term costs.
- Cognitive Biases
- Recency bias, herding, overconfidence, and narrative fallacy are hardwired. Each bubble finds a new story to explain why "this time is different."
- Innovation Outpaces Regulation
- Regulatory arbitrage is permanent. When banks are regulated, shadow banks emerge. When shadow banks are regulated, crypto emerges. Risk migrates to wherever oversight is weakest.
- "What experience and history teach us is this -- that peoples and governments have never learned anything from history."
- -- G.W.F. Hegel
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Slide 31
Crisis Comparison Table
- CrisisAssetPeak DeclineRecovery Time
- Tulip Mania (1637)Tulip bulbs-99%Never (new market)
- South Sea (1720)South Sea Co. stock-85%Never
- Great Depression (1929)US stocks (DJIA)-89%25 years (1954)
- Japan (1989)Nikkei 225-80%34 years (2024)
- Asian Crisis (1997)Thai baht-55%~10 years
- Dot-Com (2000)NASDAQ-78%15 years (2015)
- GFC (2008)US housing-35%~10 years
- Crypto (2022)Bitcoin-77%2 years (2024)
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Slide 32
Further Reading
- Essential Books
- Manias, Panics, and Crashes -- Charles Kindleberger (1978). The definitive history.
- This Time Is Different -- Reinhart & Rogoff (2009). 800 years of financial folly quantified.
- The Big Short -- Michael Lewis (2010). The 2008 crisis as human drama.
- Crashed -- Adam Tooze (2018). The GFC as geopolitical event.
- Lords of Finance -- Liaquat Ahamed (2009). Central bankers and the Great Depression.
- A Monetary History of the United States -- Friedman & Schwartz (1963). The monetarist bible.
- Key Ideas
- Minsky: Stability breeds instability through endogenous credit cycles
- Fisher: Debt-deflation spirals amplify downturns
- Bagehot: Lender of last resort must act fast, lend freely, at penalty rates
- Keynes: Animal spirits drive investment; government must fill demand gaps
- Hayek: Credit booms misallocate capital; busts are necessary corrections
- End of presentation. Financial crises are not anomalies -- they are features of capitalist economies, recurring with each generation's fresh encounter with leverage, speculation, and hubris.
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